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Abstract
This essay, prepared for a University of Cambridge conference on ‘Principles
Versus Rules in Financial Regulation’, posits a new issue in that debate. Although principles-based regulation is thought to more closely achieve normative
goals than rules, the extent to which that occurs can depend on the enforcement
regime. A person who is subject to unpredictable liability is likely to hew to the
most conservative interpretation of the principle, especially where that person
would be a potential deep pocket in litigation. This creates a paradox: unless
protected by a regime enabling one in good faith to exercise judgment without
fear of liability, such a person will effectively act as if subject to a rule and, even
worse, an unintended rule.
Keywords: financial regulation, public bond markets, indenture trustee, liability,
mortgage-backed securities.
1.

INTRODUCTION

Principles are thought more closely than rules to approximate normative goals.
Although ‘[r]ules have their virtues [and] have been widely used’, rules ‘may
——————————————————
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allow corporate actors to find ways to comply with the letter of the law while
circumventing its spirit.’1
In action, however, the extent to which principles more closely approximate
normative goals can depend on the enforcement regime. I will discuss how the
use of a principle can unintentionally approximate a rule – and, even worse, an
unintended rule – by virtue of the applicable enforcement regime.2
Principles give the actor more discretion than rules,3 and the discretion is often
intended to enable the actor to exercise good judgment. But if the actor is, or feels
he is, subject to unpredictable liability for varying from the principle, he –
especially if he would be a ‘deep pocket’ in future potential litigation – will be
likely to hew to the most conservative interpretation of the principle.4 This creates
a paradox: unless protected by a regime enabling him in good faith to exercise
judgment without fear of liability, such a person will effectively act as if subject
to a rule.5
I will discuss two areas, both in the context of financial regulation, where this
paradox is operating. The first is the role of an indenture trustee in US public
bond markets. The second is the role of a servicer of mortgage-backed securities,
as is becoming all too clear in the recent subprime mortgage crisis.

——————————————————

Cary Coglianese, Elizabeth K. Keating, Michael L. Michael and Thomas J. Healey, ‘The
Role of Government in Corporate Governance’, 1 New York University Journal of Law and
Business (2004) p. 219, at p. 222.
2 Cf., Cristie L. Ford, ‘New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities
Regulation’, 45 American Business Law Journal (2008) p. 1, at p. 10 (observing that ‘principles
may slide into rules over time because people and systems may desire more certainty than they
find principles provide’).
3 Provisions are often functionally classified as principles or rules based on the discretion
given to the actor. The exact manner of classifying provisions as principles or rules is
contested, however, the relative discretion reposed in actors being but one way to classify.
Lawrence A. Cunningham, ‘A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based
Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting’, 60 Vanderbilt Law
Review (2007) p. 1411, at pp. 1420-22.
4 Although this may well be a rational response, it is probably exacerbated by the normal
human tendency towards risk aversion. See, e.g., Linda Babcock, Henry S. Farber, Cynthia
Fobian and Eldar Shafir, ‘Forming Beliefs about Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk
and Reservation Values’, 15 International Review of Law and Economics (1995) p. 289, at pp.
290, 296-97 (discussing risk aversion); Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘The Inherent Irrationality of
Judgment Proofing’, 52 Stanford Law Review (1999) p. 1, at p. 27 (same).
5 Uncertainty resulting in sub-optimisation is not a new concept. Cf., John E. Calfee and
Richard Craswell, ‘Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards’, 70
Virginia Law Review (1984) p. 965, at pp. 975-79 (analysing uncertainty under a negligence
standard to demonstrate how over-compliance can sub-optimise social costs).
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THE PRUDENT MAN AND THE BEST-INTEREST PRINCIPLE

An indenture trustee’s role in US public bond markets is to represent the diverse
bondholders. The indenture trustee’s standard of performance under applicable
law is governed by a principle: to act, after default on the bonds, as a ‘prudent
man’ in like circumstances.6 However, even though this standard has existed since
1939, there are few interpretive guidelines because most lawsuits against indenture trustees are settled.7 Thus, ‘courts have not even resolved such fundamental
issues as the extent, if any, to which an indenture trustee’s post-default duty to
bondholders is fiduciary in nature.’8 Moreover, typically being large financial
institutions, indenture trustees are often the only deep pocket if the issuer of
bonds defaults and thus are highly exposed to lawsuits.9 They therefore generally
operate as if they will be sued if the issuer defaults.10
For these reasons – the risk of unpredictable liability exacerbated by the likelihood of being sued as a deep pocket – the unintended result of the ‘prudent man’
standard is that some of the best financial institutions avoid acting as indenture
trustees, and those institutions that do act as indenture trustees devote substantial
energy to avoiding personal liability and often hew to excessively conservative
courses of action, thereby failing to optimally protect bondholders.11
For example, liability-avoiding strategies may incongruously entail strict enforcement of an indenture’s remedial provisions, even when inaction by the
indenture trustee might be the optimal course for bondholders.12 Strict enforcement sometimes can even unnecessarily force the issuer into bankruptcy, resulting
in less recovery for bondholders than in the case of an out-of-court restructuring.13
If the indenture trustee does not take enforcement action, however, ‘it will most
likely be liable for negligence.’14 The indenture trustee therefore can find itself
——————————————————

US Trust Indenture Act, § 315(c).
Steven L. Schwarcz and Gregory M. Sergi, ‘Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the
Indenture Trustee’, 59 Alabama Law Review (2008) pp. 1037-1072.
8 Id. at p. 1049.
9 Id. at p. 1050.
10 Id. at p. 1053.
11 Id. at p. 1056.
12 See, e.g., Robert I. Landau and John E. Krueger, Corporate Trust Administration and
Management (New York, Columbia University Press 1998) p. 138 (observing that ‘the trustee
may logically be inclined to take immediate action under the remedial provisions [of the
indenture] to avoid being subjected to substantial potential liability’).
13 See James E. Spiotto, Defaulted Securities: The Prudent Indenture Trustee’s Guide XII14 (New York, CFA Institute 1990).
14 Henry F. Johnson, ‘The “Forgotten” Securities Statute: Problems in the Trust Indenture
Act’, 13 University of Toledo Law Review (1982) p. 92, at p. 111: ‘Clearly, if the trustee
initiates default proceedings, its actions may well result in bankruptcy, the result of which
would be that its bondholders receive nothing. On the other hand, if the trustee does not act, it
will most likely be liable for negligence. What, then, is “prudent”?’
6
7
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between the proverbial Scylla and Charybdis – having to decide between forcing
the issuer into bankruptcy on one side and facing potential liability for inaction on
the other.15
Another area where this paradox is operating is the role of the servicer of
mortgage-backed securities.16 After mortgage loans are originated, they are
packaged into securities which, in turn, are sold to investors. Not unlike an
indenture trustee, servicers act to represent the diverse holders of the mortgagebacked securities, although for the limited purpose of servicing and administering
collections on the underlying mortgage loans.17
The servicer’s standard of performance is governed by a principle: to act ‘in
the best interests’ of the investors holding the mortgage-backed securities.18
Subject to that principle, the servicer may restructure defaulting mortgage loans
by changing the rate of interest, the principal amount, or the maturity dates.19
Investors in securities backed by a defaulting loan generally recover more if the
loan is restructured than if the mortgage is foreclosed.20
In practice, though, restructuring can expose the servicer to unpredictable
liability because of the nature of the cash flows on mortgage-backed securities.
Cash flows deriving from principal amounts and interest on the underlying
mortgage loans are separately allocated to different investor classes, or ‘tranches’,
of the securities.21 Thus, a restructuring that, for example, reduces the interest rate
on an underlying loan could adversely affect investors in an interest-only tranche
of the securities. These conflicts become even more complicated for subprime
mortgage-backed securities, which sometimes include prepayment-penalty
tranches ‘hav[ing] different priorities relative to one another for the purpose of
——————————————————

15 See Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. E-II Holdings, 926 F.2d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1991)
(likening an indenture trustee’s position to navigating between Scylla and Charybdis).
16 For a description of the various types of mortgage-backed securities, including their
contribution to the subprime mortgage crisis, see Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Protecting Financial
Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown’, 93 Minnesota Law Review (2008),
at pp. 373-406.
17 See, e.g., James A. Rosenthal and Juan M. Ocampo, Securitization of Credit: Inside the
New Technology of Finance (New York, Wiley 1988), at pp. 49-51 (explaining the servicing of
assets underlying asset-backed securities).
18 Schwarcz, supra n. 18. Although in the case of servicers the principle is established
contractually rather than by statute, the analysis conceptually should be the same except insofar
as potential solutions are concerned. See infra n. 55 and accompanying text (observing that a
principle imposed by contract is subject to ex post negotiation).
19 Schwarcz, supra n. 18.
20 Presentation by Joseph R. Mason, Associate Professor of Finance and LeBow Research
Fellow, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, to the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland at its workshop on ‘Structured Finance and Loan Modification’, 20 November 2007
(notes on Mason’s presentation on file with author).
21 See, e.g., Jon D. Van Gorp, Capital Markets Dispersion of Subprime Mortgage Risk
(unpublished November 2007 manuscript, on file with author) pp. 7-8.
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absorbing losses and prepayments on the underlying subprime mortgage loans.’22
To try to minimise their potential liability, servicers of mortgage-backed securities usually eschew restructuring a defaulted mortgage loan, which involves the
exercise of judgment, and instead favour foreclosing on the mortgage, which is
much more ministerial.23 As a result, it is questionable whether servicers truly act
‘in the best interests’ of investors in mortgage-backed securities.
These are but two examples of the principles paradox. Other examples might
arise in myriad ways, such as under US anti-money laundering regulations, in
which banks face penalties if they fail to file ‘Suspicious Activity Reports’ with
the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN) for any transaction that ‘has no business or apparent lawful purpose or
is not the sort in which the particular customer would normally be expected to
engage’ if the bank ‘knows of no reasonable explanation for the transaction after
examining the available facts.’24 Given these broad principles, the cost of making
an examination and the penalties for non-compliance, banks file Suspicious
Activity Reports for virtually all conceivably suspicious transactions, effectively
overloading FinCEN with reams of worthless paper.25
Although these examples of the principles paradox are centred in the United
States, the potential for this type of paradox has been noticed abroad. In the
United Kingdom, for example, the recent push by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) for more principles-based regulation 26 has motivated some observers to
note that, when faced with unpredictable liability, ‘senior management will err on
the side of caution …, potentially hampering innovation and stifling competition.’27 The FSA itself may be inadvertently exacerbating this paradox by ‘often
stat[ing] that it will hold senior management to account for a firm’s failures’28 –
.

——————————————————

Id. at p. 8.
Presentation by Kathleen C. Engel, Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law, to the US Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 20 November 2007 (notes on
this presentation on file with author).
24 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(4)(iii) (2008). This example was suggested by Professor Charles M.
Kahn, Department of Finance, University of Illinois, and Houblon-Norman Fellow, Bank of
England.
25 See, e.g., Scot J. Paltrow, ‘U.S. Says Banks Overreport Data for Patriot Act’, Wall Street
Journal, 7 July 2005, at C1. (reporting ‘[A] handful of banks … were fined for failing to report
suspect transactions. This has prompted executives to file more “suspicious-activity reports” –
the majority of which involve activity that isn’t suspicious at all’).
26 FSA, Principles-based Regulation, Focusing on the Outcomes That Matter (April 2007).
27 Carlos Conceicao and Rosalind Gray, ‘Principles-Based Regulation – Problems of
Uncertainty’, 26 International Financial Law Review (June 2007) p. 42, at p. 43.
28 Conceicao and Gray, supra n. 29, at p. 42. See also Julia Black, ‘Using Rules
Effectively’, in C. McCrudden, ed., Regulation and Deregulation: Policy and Practice in the
Utilities and Financial Services Industries (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1999) at p. 95 [pinpoint
cite]) (observing that imposing personal liability on management for non-compliance ‘could
prompt the tendency for managers to follow internal guidelines by the letter, rather than allowing
22
23
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thereby targeting management not unlike deep-pocket exposure.29 Other observers
have likewise noted that the inherent ambiguity of principles, as compared to
rules, makes
‘the anticipated error costs for firms of “getting it wrong” … higher with respect to Principles than detailed rules (assuming the approach to enforcement
is otherwise the same), and firms will structure their behaviour accordingly.
There is a potential danger that this will lead to “over-compliance”, with firms
adopting overly conservative courses of action thinking that to do otherwise
will be considered by the FSA to constitute non-compliance.’30

3.

HOW TO RESOLVE THE ‘PRINCIPLES’ PARADOX

In order to avoid this paradox, either the risk of unpredictable liability must be
reduced or parties must be compensated sufficiently to accept the risk.31 Because
of the human tendency towards risk aversion,32 a ‘sufficient’ amount of compensation is likely to be higher than the risk would objectively justify.33 I therefore
focus on reducing the risk of unpredictable liability.
In concept, there are at least two ways to reduce the risk of unpredictable liability. The first is to grant a measure of discretion to parties attempting to
comply with the regulatory principle. In the trust indenture context, for example, I
recently argued that the liability of indenture trustees under the prudent-man
standard should be interpreted by a business judgment rule, to encourage inden——————————————————

flexible approaches to be adopted to fit the circumstances, or remove the motivation to undertake
particular activities at all’).
29 For a discussion of possible distinctions between principles-based regulation enforced by
government regulators, like the FSA, and principles-based regulation enforced by private
lawsuits, see infra n. 59 et seq. and accompanying text.
30 Julia Black, Martyn Hopper and Christa Band, ‘Making a Success of Principles-based
Regulation’, 1 Law and Financial Markets Review (May 2007) p. 191, at p. 199. Yet another
example of the principles paradox was identified by Professor Kahn at the University of
Cambridge Conference. During a discussion of cross-border delegation of insurance regulation,
he observed that a regulator in one country would be more cautious about delegating regulatory
authority to another country’s insurance regulator if the latter’s performance were to be based
on principles rather than precise rules. (Notes of this discussion on file with author.)
31 Cf., Charles M. Kahn, Discussion of Steven L. Schwarcz ‘The “Principles” Paradox’
(unpublished manuscript presented at the University of Cambridge Conference on 11 April
2008, on file with author) ( posing the possibility of paying managers higher salaries that take
into account the risk of unpredictable liability).
32 See supra n. 6.
33 Perhaps this is why, in a corporate governance context, the law evolved to protect
directors under a business judgment rule rather than directors being paid salaries sufficient to
accept the risk absent that protection. See infra nn. 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing
the business judgment rule).
.
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ture trustees to exercise their judgment.34 In the corporate governance context, a
business judgment rule is intended to protect directors who take calculated risks
in an attempt to maximise corporate value.35 Courts examine a corporate director’s decision ‘only to the extent necessary to verify the presence of a business
decision, disinterestedness and independence, due care, good faith, and the
absence of an abuse of discretion.’36 The business judgment rule is justified by the
duty of corporate directors to maximise value for shareholders, which requires the
exercise of discretion. Similarly, the duty of an indenture trustee after default is
(unlike the duty of traditional trustees to merely preserve existing value) to
maximise recovery for bondholders, again requiring the exercise of discretion.37
An indenture trustee’s duty to act prudently therefore should be tempered, as in
corporation law, by a business judgment rule.
Granting a measure of discretion to parties attempting to comply with regulatory principles may not always work, however. Although this essay argues that
principles can cause parties to hew to the most conservative interpretation,
principles sometimes can have the opposite effect – motivating only minimally
compliant behaviour.38 Discretion works well when the parties are subject to
overall community norms, as should be the case for the relatively small community of professional institutional indenture trustees. But when such norms are
lacking, granting discretion to parties subject to principles-based regulation can
become a blank check for abuse. For example, some parties, especially those only
minimally risk averse, may ‘adopt a minimum standard and, as the [principle] is
not precise in the conduct it requires, simply hope to argue the point with the
regulator at a later date.’39 Parties also might take advantage of limited governmental enforcement capability.40 For these reasons, it is less obvious that servicers
of mortgage-backed securities, who are often smaller and less well-established
——————————————————

Schwarcz and Sergi, supra n. 9.
See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (explaining that the purpose of
the business judgment rule is to ‘protect and promote the full and free exercise of the
managerial power granted to Delaware directors’).
36 Nancy Barton, Dennis J. Block and Stephen A. Radin, The Business Judgment Rule:
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors (Aspen Publishers, NY, 1998), at p. 20. The business
judgment rule does not directly affect the standard of conduct but is more properly
characterised as a ‘tool of judicial review’.
37 Schwarcz and Sergi, supra n. 9.
38 Cf., Black, supra n. 30, at p. 95 (asserting that unless law ‘set[s] out the conduct required
in some detail[,] there will be those who seek only to do the minimum necessary to comply’).
39 Black, supra n. 30.
40 According to the US General Accounting Office, for example, the SEC has had an
increasingly inadequate labour force since 1995. GAO Report GAO-02-302, SEC Operations:
Increased Workload Creates Challenges (5 March 2002) (describing workload exceeding
available workers since 1995 and also the SEC’s small salaries compared to other federal
agencies, which contributes to very high turnover), available at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d02302.pdf>.
34
35
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companies in a relatively new area of financing,41 should be granted the same
measure of discretion 42 when complying with their servicing duties.
Another possible way of reducing the risk of unpredictable liability is to provide interpretive guidelines for complying with the principle.43 For example,
many questions of commercial law in the United States turn on the seemingly
vague principle of ‘commercial reasonableness’, but this principle is well defined
through the Uniform Commercial Code’s detailed Official Comments 44 as well as
custom and usage of trade.45 There are also other sources of interpretive guidance.
Outside the context of financial regulation, for example, the ‘reasonable man’
standard of negligence law in the United States benefits from centuries of
interpretive guidance through court decisions,46 making negligence liability
reasonably predictable.47
.

.

——————————————————

41 Schwarcz, supra n. 18 (observing that these servicers are usually the originators of the
securitised mortgage loans or a specialised servicing company such as Countrywide Home
Loans Servicing LP).
42 That is, protection against liability under a ‘business judgment’-type rule.
43 Cf., Colin S. Diver, ‘The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules’, 93 Yale Law
Journal (1983-84) p. 65, at p. 69 (observing that an ambiguous principle can become more
transparent in an interpretive context). Interpretive guidance is not, however, foolproof, and
sometimes can be misleading, especially if it is issued non-contemporaneously with the
principle or by different, less informed, regulators. Also, the use of interpretive guidelines
transforms a principles-based system into more of a principles-and-rules blended system. Cf.,
Cunningham, supra n. 5 (arguing that the practical need for interpretive guidance makes
illusory the goal of a pure ‘principles-based’ system).
44 Each section of the UCC is accompanied by one or more Official Comments which,
though not technically enacted into law, are viewed as ‘authoritative statements concerning the
intent of the drafters.’ Richard Hyland and Dennis Patterson, An Introduction to Commercial
Law (Los Angeles, West Group Publishing 1999), at p. 7. As such, they often ‘ease the
comprehension difficulties’ of interpreting UCC sections.
45 See, e.g., UCC § 1-303 (making course of dealing and usage of trade relevant to
interpreting what is commercially reasonable in the circumstances). But cf., Alan Schwartz and
Robert E. Scott, Commercial Transactions, Principles and Policies, 2d. edn. (West Publishing
Company 1991), at pp. 17-18 (observing that Karl Llewellyn, the principal architect of the
UCC, contemplated that vague terms like commercial reasonableness would be interpreted by
merchant juries, thereby having ‘courts … deduce moral norms from the customs of “good”
merchants’; that other drafters of the UCC overruled Llewellyn on merchant juries; and that
‘[e]liminating the merchant jury while retaining the vague admonitions [like commercial
reasonableness] is a drafting disaster’).
46 For an explanation of why this interpretive guidance does not, and should not, inform the
‘reasonable man’ standard of indenture trustees, see Schwarcz and Sergi, supra n. 9.
47 The case law has clearly defined this standard in the negligence context.
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CONCLUSIONS

The principles paradox 48 can be avoided by reducing the risk of unpredictable
liability. Although in concept that risk can be reduced by either granting a
measure of discretion to the actor when complying, or providing the actor with
interpretive guidelines for complying, with the regulatory principle, realistic
solutions to the paradox are very much contextually driven. For this essay’s
indenture-trustee example, interpretive guidelines are lacking because most
lawsuits against indenture trustees are settled.49 Granting discretion through a
business judgment rule, however, has been shown to be an appropriate solution in
this particular case.50
Contrast this essay’s example of servicers of mortgage-backed securities. Not
only are interpretive guidelines lacking (due to the complexity and relative
novelty of the servicing functions 51 ) but granting discretion, whether through a
business judgment rule or otherwise, is less clearly appropriate than in the
indenture-trustee context.52 That the servicing function is contractual, however,
suggests a solution that might work in this particular context: parties to existing
servicing contracts could attempt to renegotiate their contracts ex post, and future
servicing contracts could be written, to actually provide interpretive guidelines.53
It will also be interesting to observe what lessons arise from the FSA’s push
for more principles-based regulation.54 The FSA might, for example, be able to
avoid the principles paradox by granting good-faith discretionary leeway to firms
when complying with FSA regulation 55 or by providing interpretive guidance,
perhaps not unlike the UCC’s Official Comments.56 In the latter case, the ultimate
question will be whether, given FSA-promulgated principles and guidance, firms
.

.

.

.

——————————————————

48 Recall that under this paradox, an actor who is, or feels he is, subject to unpredictable
liability for varying from a principle is likely, especially if he would be a ‘deep pocket’ in
future potential litigation, to hew to the most conservative interpretation of the principle,
effectively acting as if subject to a rule.
49 See supra nn. 8-10 and accompanying text.
50 See supra nn. 36-39 and accompanying text.
51 See supra nn 22-24 and accompanying text.
52 See supra nn. 43-44 and accompanying text.
53 See Schwarcz, supra n. 18 ( proposing this solution).
54 See supra n. 28 and accompanying text.
55 Cf., Black, Hopper and Band, supra n. 32, at p. 197 (observing that ‘[a] degree of
uncertainty can be accepted if firms know that the regulator will allow them a certain “margin
of appreciation” in their interpretations, and will respect due efforts to construct a reasonable
interpretation and act accordingly’).
56 Cf., Principles-based Regulation, supra n. 28, at p. 22 (stating that ‘firms … concerned
that it will be harder to make … predictions in a more principles-based world … will be able to
place reliance on materials we [FSA] publish or confirm’).
.
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will be able to predict the consequences of their actions.57 The answer to this
question will partly depend on what type of ‘interpretive community’– or
relationship between a regulator and regulated parties in which ‘the interpretive
assumptions and procedures are so widely shared … that the [regulatory principle] bears the same meaning for all’58 – the FSA fosters with regulated parties.
The concept of an interpretive community also provides a useful perspective
from which to view possible distinctions between principles-based regulation
enforced by government regulators and principles-based regulation enforced by
private lawsuits. Government regulators should be willing to form at least some
type of interpretive community with regulated parties.59 In contrast, plaintiffs and
their lawyers are, by definition, adversaries of the regulated party and thus
unwilling, at least absent a settlement process, to form such a community;
litigants indeed represent the antithesis of an interpretive community.
The result is that, in a governmentally-enforced context, vague terms like
‘prudent man’ and acting ‘in the best interests’ of investors may gain definition
through use and regulatory feedback,60 whereas in a privately-enforced context
these terms (as this essay demonstrates) will remain vague unless clarified by
courts. Absent such clarification, plaintiffs and lawyers will engage in rentseeking behaviour, claiming that regulated parties failed to comply with their
required standards.61 Like this essay’s example of indenture-trustee behaviour,
regulated parties will then be motivated to hew to the most conservative interpretation of the principle to avoid litigation.

——————————————————

57 Compare comments of Eilis Ferran, Professor of Company and Securities Law,
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law, at the University of Cambridge Conference, 12 April
2008 (expressing concern that, because its strategy is to enforce on the basis of principles alone,
the FSA’s assurance that firms will find it possible to predict the consequences of their actions
will be ‘just empty words’).
58 See Black, supra n. 30. Professor Black also uses the terms ‘general rules’ to mean what
this essay describes as principles and ‘precise rules’ to mean what this essay describes as rules.
For clarity, this essay substitutes the word ‘principle’ in the above quotation.
59 Cf., e-mail from Cristie Ford, Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia
Faculty of Law, to the author (19 April 2008) (observing that ‘Regulators need information
from industry to remain relevant, just as industry needs information from regulators to remain
compliant’).
60 Cf., Black, supra n. 30 (arguing that vague terms ‘such as “fair”, “reasonable”, or “due
care”’ can gain ‘particular meaning in a particular community, in which case [these terms] will be
clear to members of that community, although opaque to those outside it’).
61 Such standards being governed by the applicable principle.

